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A renaissance of warfare is one of the most striking features of the early twenty-
first century. War, it seems, is not the prerogative of international criminals, but 
the first resort of the righteous. Since 11 September 2001, it is widely believed, 
America has shown that might can indeed enforce right. As Polly Toynbee, one 
of Britain's foremost liberal commentators, put it, 'bombing works'. The 
confidence in this position, especially in America, involves a striking reversal of 
the pacifistic sentiments that largely prevailed in Western democracies during 
much of  the  las t  century.  I t  i s  a  ver i tab le  r e l eg i t imat ion  of  war. 
I call it this because warfare had been comprehensively – if obviously not finally – 
delegitimised during the course of the twentieth century. In 1914-18, the trenches 
of Flanders gave us the paradigm of 'senseless slaughter' that helped frame a 
'structure of feeling' about war that remained influential throughout the century. 
So the new resort to war in 1939-45 in Western democracies was heavier-hearted, 
accompanied by less jingoism, and motivated as much by anti-fascism as by 
nationalism. True, this did seem to many like a good war, a perception that has 
 2 
been greatly accentuated in more recent times by the misrepresentation of the war 
almost as a crusade to halt the Holocaust. But this increasingly appeared very 
much as an exception. The threat of nuclear extermination created an 
overwhelming perception, during most of the second half of the twentieth century, 
that major war was to be prevented at almost all costs. Vietnam reinforced the 
anti-war structure of feeling by showing how even the limited kind of war, that 
could be fought despite nuclear weapons, would also involve senseless slaughter. 
The importance of this experience was that it affected the most powerful Western 
state, the only one (apart perhaps from Britain) in which the use of war was not 
already delegitimised by the horrors of 1939-45. 
The relegitimation of war is not an entirely new phenomenon. One element of it 
derives from a similar source as the understanding of the Second World War as 
'good'. This is the role of war, or at least of organised military force, in halting 
genocide and other violence against civilians. This new 'positive' was already 
emerging at the time of the last great peace movement in Europe, the campaign 
against nuclear weapons in the 1980s. At that time, however, the examples of 
good war came from Third World states like Vietnam (in Cambodia) and 
Tanzania (in Uganda). More recently, of course, this has come to be called 
'humanitarian intervention’ and has become a declared aim of much Western-
sponsored military action. 
This was always, however, only one strand of the new Western willingness to 
resort to war. Margaret Thatcher pioneered a different mode, 20 years ago in the 
Falklands, and with the end of the Cold War the United States also begin to fight 
real wars with success again. The first President Bush 'kicked the Vietnam 
syndrome' in the war against Iraq in 1991 and NATO successfully concluded its 
first ever war over Kosovo in 1999. So the ground was well prepared for President 
George W. Bush to pronounce his 'war against terrorism' and before long claim 
victory in this enterprise. 
So until recently, the legacy of this last century's pacific lessons seemed powerful. 
With the US success in Afghanistan, however, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the trend is very much the other way. A series of almost 
unprecedented successes in the use of arms, by the most powerful forces on the 
planet, threatens to give warfare a strong new momentum. At the moment there 
is little attention to the contradictions of this development – opposed mainly by 
those who confuse it with earlier manifestations of Western military power – still 
less the troubling consequences that it could bring to world society in the coming 
decades. 
In this paper, I will first consider the war in Afghanistan as the latest example of 
the new Western way of war, and analyse its casualties alongside those of 
previous campaigns in the Gulf and Kosovo. I shall identify the new type as 'risk-
transfer war', a central feature of which is a 'militarism of small massacres'. I shall 
argue that this new type thus offers only a partial answer to the problems, for the 
legitimacy of warfare, caused by the systematic targeting of civilians in earlier 
‘degenerate war’. Despite a closer approximation to ‘just war’ criteria, the 
application of which the new mode I shall discuss, inequalities of risk between 
Western military personnel and civilians in the zone of war revive the question of 
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legitimacy in a new form. The paper then suggests that in our concern for 
relatively small numbers of civilian casualties, we may be applying to war 
standards from which it has historically been exempt. In this context, I shall argue 
that the contradictions of the new Western way of war reinforce a 'historical 
pacifist' position towards the legitimacy of warfare. 
  
I Death tolls in the 'war against terrorism' 
Carl Conetta analysed direct civilian casualties from Operation Enduring 
Freedom, to late January 2002. He concluded that a safe estimate would be in the 
range 1000-1300. He argued that 'If all Taliban government and Afghan refugee 
accounts of the numbers of civilians killed or wounded in the bombing campaign 
are taken at face value they would suggest a total of more than 5,000 killed and 
10,000 wounded. … It is likely that the actual toll is less than one-quarter as 
many. This discrepancy, although large, is not particularly surprising. In the 
United States, official estimates of the number of people killed on 11 September 
were initially twice as high as where they sit today. It took more than a month for 
the figures to be adjusted downward and more than two months before they came 
close to the present official estimate. ... The final accounting of the deaths 
suffered on 11 September will probably be 50 percent below the estimates that 
prevailed during the first month after the attack.' 
To these civilian deaths must be added, however, Conetta concluded (in a 
companion study), 'A minimum of 3,000 civilian deaths attributable to the impact 
of the bombing campaign and war on the nation's refugee and famine crises.' His 
report uses 'an estimate of 8,000-18,000 Afghani deaths occurring during the mid-
September to mid-January period and due to starvation, exposure, associated 
illnesses, or injury sustained while in flight from war zones. Of this total, at least 
40 percent of the deaths (3200+) are attributed to the effects of the crisis and war.' 
It will be noted that because there were multiple causes of these categories of 
civilian deaths, Conetta is reduced to ascribing a percentage of them to the US 
campaign. Clearly this procedure is fraught with methodological difficulties, but 
something like this may be necessary if we wish to put a figure to the deaths 
caused by the US bombing. 
To these, Conetta argues, must be further added '800+ troop deaths due to post-
war reprisals and mis-management of prisoners' (the inclusion of this figure is 
justified because once captured Taliban-al Qaida fighters are no longer 
combatants). Therefore using what he regards as conservative estimates, his 
report leads to the conclusion that the total of non-combatant deaths as a result of 
the American military campaign, up to January 2001, was 5,000 or more. (This 
figure was already higher, therefore, than the likely final toll of around three 
thousand civilian deaths in New York and Washington.) 
These estimates do not address, of course, the killing among the Taliban and al-
Qaida fighters as such. It is obvious that while the US aimed to minimise the 
number of civilian casualties, it actually intended to kill enemy fighters through 
the formidable bombing campaign that was stepped up markedly towards the end 
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of 2001 and continued well into 2002. It seems likely, therefore, that the numbers 
of enemy combatants killed was considerably in excess of the numbers of direct 
civilian deaths (although it is not certain that would continue to be true if all 
indirect civilian casualties were added in). However we have no figures on enemy 
combatant deaths. 
We need to set against these considerations of civilian and enemy deaths the 
death tolls of the US and allied forces, as well as deaths of civilians due to the 
actions of the enemy, i.e. the Taliban-al Qaida. Only one US officer was killed by 
the enemy during the period covered by Conetta’s figures (a CIA operative killed 
in the Mazar-e-Sharif prison rebellion), although several died in vehicle and 
helicopter accidents. The death toll among local allied forces, the Northern 
Alliance/United Front, during this period is likely to have been greater than that 
of the Americans but much less than that of the Taliban-al Qaida, but again we 
have no figures. The numbers of civilians killed by the Taliban-al Qaida during 
the period of the war, as opposed to the longer period of their misrule in 
Afghanistan and earlier periods of civil war, is also likely to have been small. 
However they also contributed to the indirect civilian casualties of the recent 
conflict. 
Comparisons with the other two Western wars of the global era are interesting. 
Looking at these wars, for the measures suggested by this discussion, we find the 
pattern suggested in Table 1. The figures given are generally more conservative 
estimates. Naturally most of these figures are disputed. For example, estimates of 
total Iraqi deaths in the Gulf war have gone into 6 figures. The figure of 12,000 
civilian casualties of Serbian action in Kosovo includes up to 2,000 who are 
estimated to have been killed before NATO bombing began, and 10,000 widely 
claimed to have been killed immediately after the NATO bombing. However 
critics of NATO point to the fact that only about 2,500 bodies have been 
exhumed to suggest that this figure is exaggerated; while on the other side, the 
Council of Human Rights and Freedoms in Pristina has recently claimed that an 
additional 3,000 remain unaccounted for. Although it is important to arrive at 
precise figures, this paper is concerned with the broad relativities of the exposure 
to risk of death among different groups of combatants. Its arguments would not 
be seriously affected by any of the adjustments suggested by these points of view, 
and so detailed arguments about death tolls will not be pursued further. 
[Table 1 here] 
The US's war in Afghanistan has been seen by its supporters as 'targeted' violence, 
by opponents as 'indiscriminate' slaughter. The discussion so far suggests that 
both of these claims are too simple. Certainly, the bombing has been quite 
successfully targeted. The likelihood is that as in the Gulf and (less markedly) 
Kosovo, the numbers of enemy combatants directly killed is greater than the 
number of civilian deaths similarly caused. The absolute number of civilians 
killed in this war, as in the previous two, is very small by comparison with 
historic US campaigns (e.g. Vietnam and Korea, as well as the world wars). To 
this extent, the charge of 'indiscriminate' killing of civilians appears inappropriate. 
However all killing of those who are not directly targeted clearly shows definite 
limits to discrimination. This kind of killing, notoriously called 'collateral damage', 
 5 
cannot be avoided entirely in any long-distance use of powerful weapons and is 
inherently disturbing however much it has been scaled down from the historic 
pattern. 
However the data in Table 1 suggest a rather different perspective. Not only does 
the increase in direct civilian casualties compared to Kosovo suggest some 
distinctive military objectives and methods in the Afghan war, as Conetta 
explains. The general pattern, across the three wars, is also highly interesting. 
Most striking of all is that, after the relatively very low level of Western military 
casualties in the Gulf, the West has managed virtually to eliminate such casualties 
in the two most recent wars. And so in comparison to the tiny numbers of Western 
military casualties, the numbers of both direct and indirect civilian casualties - as well as of 
local-allied and (even more) enemy combatants - appear large. 
  
II Risk-transfer militarism: the new Western way of war 
Although civilian casualties are routinely described as accidents, this outcome is 
hardly accidental. It is the product of political choices in the refinement of 
Western military power, at three main levels: strategy, weaponry and media 
management. The combination of these elements enables the West to fight wars 
at little human cost to itself. And since the risk to human lives, pictured on 
television, has been since Vietnam the major political risk of war, this also means 
that the West is able to fight wars with a great reduction in the political costs. For 
the US, Afghanistan was never going to be another Vietnam, or even a repeat of 
the Soviet experience in the same country two decades earlier. American 
strategists, with practice in the new way of war in the Gulf and Kosovo behind 
them, could be reasonably confident of that. 
The war in Afghanistan was thus an example of a new Western way of war. This 
'new' war is not, of course, entirely new. It is a reinvention of the reliance on 
airpower that has been central to Anglo-American military thought and practice 
since the 1920s. The new mode relies on bombing – by both manned bombers and 
cruise missiles – even more than before. However it uses the enhanced precision 
that computer electronics brings to targeting (the so-called 'Revolution in Military 
Affairs') to avoid the large-scale and widespread massacres of enemy civilians that 
occurred in the Second World War and Vietnam. It increasingly uses local allies 
to carry out actual fighting on the ground. And it uses media management to 
mitigate the effects of the 'small' massacres that 'accidentally' happen, as well as of 
the (sometimes larger) numbers of indirect casualties. 
In this way, the new way of war appears to transcend the fundamental 
degeneracy of earlier bombing, manifested in indiscriminate targeting of civilians 
and huge numbers of non-combatant deaths. But it introduces new contradictions, 
through the multiple transfers of risk, particularly to civilian populations, which 
result in the distribution of death that I discussed above. The comprehensive 
transfer of risks away from Western military personnel appears to be a major aim 
of the new way of war. And the significance of this aim shows how closely the 
new way of fighting is linked to the new way of managing news media and public 
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opinion, and designed to maintain the legitimacy of war in Western societies. 
And so we can call this way of war risk-transfer militarism, not just risk-transfer war. 
To summarise, we can identify 5 major elements in this new militarism: 
1 Killing the enemy 
The principal risks of being killed (as a direct consequence of military action) are 
actually applied to enemy armed forces, rather than civilians. This was clearly 
true in the Gulf War and has almost certainly been so in Afghanistan. In a 
historic sense, this is a transfer of risk back from enemy civilians towards the 
enemy military as such, and appears to reverse (at least for Western campaigns) 
the long twentieth-century trend towards overwhelmingly civilian casualties. This 
is clearly of great significance for arguments about the legitimacy of war. 
2 Local allies take the risks on the ground 
The risks of ground combat, on the Western/US side, are transferred to local 
allies (based in the zone of conflict) wherever possible. The increasingly 
interdependence between Western airpower and local armies on the ground (the 
Croatian and Bosnian armies, the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Northern 
Alliance-United Front) enables the West to transfer of greater share of battle 
casualties to them. (This element was not developed far in the Gulf: although 
Kuwaiti and Saudi forces did play a certain role, the Shi'ite and Kurdish 
insurgents in Iraq were abandoned by the US, a crucial error of the war.) 
3. Small 'accidental' civilian massacres  
The risk of repeated small massacres of civilians is an understood feature 
of the way the West fights its wars. Small massacres are 'accidental' in the 
sense that they are not specifically intended and that efforts are made to 
avoid them. But they are simultaneously programmed into the risk 
analysis of war. Each of the West's wars has been marked by numerous 
massacres, most commonly of a handful of people, but in numerous cases 
of 50-100 civilians at a time, with the largest single incident being the 
Amirya shelter bombing in Baghdad in 1991, in which around 400 died. 
The risk of massacres is not only known and understood by Western 
military planners, it is a completely predictable consequence of the 
protection provided to Western aircrew. Reliance on high-altitude 
bombing makes aircrew safe; but it inevitably leads to errors of targeting in 
which hundreds or thousands of civilians die in each campaign. So the 
transfer to civilians of the risks of being directly killed is deliberate and 
systematic. 
4. Media management  
Because direct civilian killing on any scale could threaten the mediated 
legitimacy of the war, media management is a key element in risk-transfer 
militarism. Mediation and surveillance have become intrinsic to this 
refined mode of post-total war, but they can make it particularly 
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problematic. Western governments want no more TV pictures of direct 
victims than absolutely unavoidable: the largest massacres, like the 
Amirya bombing in the Gulf War and the bombings of a train in Serbia 
and of a refugee convoy in Kosovo, threaten legitimacy and are subject to 
intensive 'spin' to reduce their effects. Likewise, Western governments 
want no threateningly large direct casualty numbers. Thus Robin Cook, 
Leader of the British House of Commons, indicated at the beginning of the 
US war in Afghanistan that it would be acceptable because the numbers of 
its civilian casualties would be fewer than the death toll from September 
11. That the number of direct civilian deaths is now estimated, e.g. by 
Conetta, at under half that total will be seen as supportive by Western 
politicians, even if the total number of deaths may be greater. 
5. Indirect civilian casualties  
A corollary of this is that indirect and less visible casualties are more acceptable 
than direct casualties, and less decisive efforts may be made to minimise these. 
Where there are other possible causes of death - enemy policies, civil war, 
drought, etc. - responsibility is less easy to pin down and therefore the West finds 
the risks more acceptable. The fact that experts like Conetta can ascribe a figure 
to indirect bombing deaths only by making an arbitrary assumption about the 
proportion of them caused by US action, indicates the lesser political danger that 
indirect deaths cause for Western leaders. Of course, ever since the Kurdish 
refugee crisis after the Gulf War, Western leaders understand that even indirect 
casualties can rebound badly, where responsibility can be established. Hence 
Tony Blair tried to insert a 'humanitarian' dimension into the 'war against 
terrorism' from the start. However, Western strategists' awareness of the 
relationships between human risk and political risk may lead as much to efforts to 
deflect political responsibility as to real efforts to minimise indirect harm. This 
has been the balance of effort in Western responses to the long-running 
immiseration of the Iraqi people, through the combination of UN sanctions and 
Iraqi regime policies. 
III 'Just war' theory and risk-transfer militarism 
How do we evaluate the legitimacy of this new way of war? The principal moral 
tools that we have available derive from the just war tradition. According to this 
tradition, as is well known, both ends and means have to be just. Richard Falk, 
the radical international scholar, who says that 'I have never since my childhood 
supported a shooting war in which the United States was involved', claims that 
'The war in Afghanistan against apocalyptic terrorism qualifies in my 
understanding as the first truly just war since World War II. But the justice of the 
cause and of the limited ends is in danger of being negated by the injustice of 
improper means and excessive ends. Unlike World War II and prior just wars, 
this one can be won only if tactics adhere to legal and moral constraints on the 
means used to conduct it, and to limited ends.' 
The justice of the ends of the 'war on terrorism' is not really the subject of this 
paper. However since there is necessarily a relation betwen ends and means, it is 
worth quoting Falk's defence of the resort to war: 'The extremist political vision 
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held by Osama bin Laden, which can usefully be labeled "apocalyptic terrorism," 
places this persisting threat well outside any framework of potential reconciliation 
or even negotiation for several reasons: Its genocidal intent is directed generically 
against Americans and Jews; its proclaimed goal is waging an unconditional 
civilizational war - Islam against the West - without drawing any distinction 
between civilian and military targets; it has demonstrated a capacity and 
willingness to inflict massive and traumatizing damage on our country and a 
tactical ingenuity and ability to carry out its missions of destruction by reliance on 
the suicidal devotion of its adherents.' 
Most of this is valid, in my view. But Falk's conclusion, the necessity of war, is 
less certain. It touches on the question of means: 'The perpetrators of the 
September 11 attack cannot be reliably neutralized by nonviolent or diplomatic 
means; a response that includes military action is essential to diminish the threat 
of repetition, to inflict punishment and to restore a sense of security at home and 
abroad.' It may be true that the perpetrators 'cannot be reliably neutralized' by 
non-military means; but it is far from certain that they can be, indeed have been 
reliably neutralized by military methods, either. Military action may 'restore a 
sense of security', but it is debatable if it actually provides security. And it is not 
clear that 'inflicting punishment' is a legitimate reason for military action; this is 
more obviously a judicial function. Indeed, the dangers of militarizing civilian 
legal and administrative functions have subsequently been widely recognised as a 
cause of concern, over the issue of the treatment of prisoners. Falk himself argues 
that unless the 'necessary military element is kept subordinate to the nonmilitary 
dimensions of response, the war against global terror will be lost in the end.' 
Thus war is itself a means, the 'extension of political intercourse by other means' 
as Clausewitz famously described it. While there were not more 'reliable' means 
of 'neutralizing' the 9/11 terrorists, war was necessarily an uncertain choice among 
possible means. It may be difficult to imagine any American president not 
choosing war, after the New York and Washington massacres - but George W. 
Bush clearly did make an almost instant choice of war over law. His Wild West 
rhetoric - Bin Laden 'wanted dead or alive' - indicated an indifference to a 
painstaking judicial response. To put this choice in one sort of perspective: it is 
difficult to imagine any other Western government having acted in the same way, 
even faced with such awful events; although Russia, China or India may have 
done. 
Thus, although there are strong elements of traditional international legitimacy in 
America's response, the right to make war did not make war right. The character of 
the original attack, a manifestly criminal massacre by a terrorist network rather 
than a state, meant that a policing and legal response was a plausible alternative, 
as Michael Howard argued. This has been, for example, the response to the 1995 
Srebrenica massacre, whose perpetrators are slowly being brought before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. But the importance of 
these points is to show the connection, in this case, between the legitimacy of the 
choice of war, and the legitimacy of the means adopted within war. As Falk states, 
'the justice of the cause and of the limited ends is in danger of being negated by 
the injustice of improper means and excessive ends.' The justice of the means is 
all the more critical if we accept that there were alternatives to war. 
 9 
Let us evaluate risk-transfer militarism in just war terms. As Michael Walzer 
points out, it is axiomatic that the destruction of enemy is justified: '"Soldiers are 
made to be killed," as Napoleon once said; that is why war is hell.' There can be 
little argument, it would seem, with the apparently sharper focus, in the new way 
of war, on killing the enemy. Of course, if killing can be shown to be superfluous 
to the goal of destroying the enemy's power, then its legitimacy can be put in 
question. And violence inflicted must be proportional, not only to the goals of 
one's own side but to the severity of the initial aggression. 
On first inspection, maybe the intensive bombing of Taliban and al-Qaida fighters 
fits this bill, and the awesome weaponry used – such as the 'daisy-cutter' bombs - 
was merely an efficient means to this end. But if 'bombing worked' to defeat these 
enemies, it did so surely by slaughtering them. There are legitimate concerns 
about these victims. Since the slaughter in the trenches, we have learnt to attach 
more significance to the lives of soldiers. When one side can minimise the risk to 
its own soldiers to virtually zero, is it moral to practice industrial killing on a 
hapless enemy? The image of Iraqi conscripts bulldozed (literally) into the sand, 
at the end of the Gulf War, is emblematic of this issue. Certaintly, as we are 
moved to contemplate these inequalities of means, we should recall the slaughter 
inflicted on helpless office workers by terrorists using civilian airliners. But if the 
US's own killing is almost as one-sided, does the fact that Taliban soldiers were 
carrying guns, and politically allied to al-Qaida, make it so much more tolerable? 
If risk-transfer warfare raises questions for just war thinking even around the 
treatment of enemy soldiers, the issues concerning civilians go to the heart of the 
tradition. As Walzer continues, 'even if we take our standpoint in hell, we can still 
say that no one else [i.e. other than soldiers] is made to be killed. This distinction is 
the basis of the rules of war.' True, Walzer is prepared to countenance the 
extension of combatant status to civilian munitions workers in their workplaces, 
while they are actually making weapons, and he is also prepared to say that this 
'plausible line … may be too finely drawn'. 
However it is certain that in practice, this line has been drawn progressively less 
finely. In the Second World War, Allied military planners extended it to the point 
when area bombing of German and Japanese cities killed civilians 
indiscriminately and in huge numbers. The end-point of this process was the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the line had disappeared 
altogether. In the subsequent quarter-century, the development of nuclear 
weapons and strategy reached the point at which war could lead to the 'mutual' 
mass murder of whole nations. This truly awesome degeneration of warfare 
threatened, indeed, the more or less total extermination of human society if not of 
all life on our planet. In these developments, the practice and preparation of war 
by the most 'advanced' and 'civilised' states comprehensively negated the line 
between war and indiscriminate slaughter. While there remained significant 
differences between degenerate war and genocide, the similarities were in many 
respects more striking. 
This degeneration was hardly an episode of accidental excess. Practised on all 
sides in all three major conflicts of the twentieth century (the two world wars and 
the Cold War), it was a product of deep historic tendencies. Modern industrial 
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capitalism, with its technology and social organisation, insinuated a dynamic of 
mass slaughter into the practice of war. States' military might depended on 
economic strength and social mobilisation. As a corollary, economy and society 
in the enemy state also became 'enemies', and technology provided the means of 
attacking them on a huge scale with bombs and later missiles. There always 
remained a difference between war against civilian populations as an extension of 
the war against states (I call this 'degenerate war') and war against a civilian 
population as such (i.e. genocide). However, as in the defining case of the 
Holocaust, genocide usually took place in the context of degenerate war. 
Although categorically distinct, the two phenomena were closely related. 
In the context of this structural deformation of warfare, with its 'exterminist' 
dynamic, it was difficult to pursue the refinement of 'strategy' - let alone to 
reinsert just war considerations into a surreal moral environment. In a context 
where war constantly, massively and systematically overstepped the principal 
moral and legal boundaries that had been proposed for it, it was reasonable to 
bring these boundaries themselves into question. If military practice generally 
tended to 'make a massacre what was a war', then war itself was problematised. 
Some tried to draw a line between 'weapons of mass destruction', especially 
nuclear weapons, and forms of conventional force that could be rehabilitated, 
thus embracing 'nuclear pacifism'. I have argued that this is inadequate: the 
tendency to degeneracy is a general characteristic of modern war, not only of 
specific types of weapon system. A more appropriate response is what I have 
called 'historical pacifism', defined as the belief that there is a historical tendency 
for war to become degenerate and hence illegitimate as a means of policy. As 
support for this position, I noted not only the tendency for war between major 
states to become self-defeating, but the parallel tendency towards the redundancy 
of force in 'revolutionary' change. The latter derived from the impasse of the 
'militarised revolution', as practised in China and elsewhere, which had produced 
results as deformed and genocidal as those resulting from interstate war. 
The threatening historical redundancy of war for Western states, linked as it was 
after Vietnam with the loss of self-confidence and looming decline of world power 
in the US, spurred government and military to refine the instruments of military 
power. Likewise, since they continued to regard war as a means of policy, moral 
philosophers were propelled to refine the arguments surrounding its proper means. 
Thus Walzer's classic post-Vietnam text on just wars, which provides many of the 
foundations for the arguments offered today about the new wars. 
Walzer noted that the doctrine of 'double effect' provided a way in which 'it is 
permitted to perform an act likely to have evil consequences', such as the killing 
of innocent civilians. The key condition is that 'The good act is sufficiently good 
to compensate for the evil effect; it must be justified under [the] proportionality 
rule.' This was little justification for the atom bomb on Hiroshima, although US 
apologists had used, and still use a similar argument. However it appears 
plausible as an account of the 'accidental' killing of civilians in Afghanistan, 
Kosovo and Iraq, if only because the numbers of direct victims are much smaller 
and so the evil might conceivably be outweighed. And Walzer perfected a 
rationale that has been widely applied in these instances. 'Double effect is 
defensible', he argues, 'only when the two outcomes are the product of a double 
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intention: first that the "good" be achieved; second, that the foreseeable evil be 
reduced as far as possible.' The latter is exactly what the West now routinely 
claims to be doing in all its campaigns, with more plausibility than in the days 
before 'smarter' bombing. 
However Walzer also provided the fly in the ointment when he pointed out that 
'Simply not to intend the death of civilians is too easy. … What we look for in 
such cases is some sign of a positive commitment to save civilian lives. Civilians 
have a right to something more. And if saving civilian lives means risking 
soldiers' lives, that risk must be accepted.' In risk-transfer war, this is precisely what is 
avoided at all costs. Bombing is undertaken in the firm knowledge that it will 
increase the risk to civilians compared to other possible means, military as well as 
non-military. High-altitude destruction is inherently indiscriminate; some forms, 
at least, of action on the ground, especially on the lines of armed policing, offer 
the opportunity to discriminate more and avoid civilian casualties to a grfeater 
extent. 
Amazingly, Walzer provided a way out for Western strategists in this situation. 
He immediately qualified his statement by arguing, 'But there is a limit to the 
risks that we require. These are, after all, unintended deaths and legitimate 
military operations, and the absolute rule against attacking civilians does not 
apply. War necessarily places civilians in danger; that is another aspect of its 
hellishness. We can only ask soldiers to minimise the dangers they impose.' 
Exactly far they must go in doing this, he argues, 'is hard to say'; 'It is best … to 
say simply that that civilians have a right that "due care" is taken.' 
This sort of escape clause could have made rough and ready sense in the context 
of wars where large numbers of Western soldiers were seriously risking their own 
lives. It is difficult to see how it can be sustained in the context of wars like 
Afghanistan where, after risk assessments have been carried out, only one 
American soldier was killed by the enemy in the same period that over one 
thousand Afghan civilians were (predictably) killed by American bombs. The care 
taken for civilians is not only less than the care taken for American soldiers, it is 
undermined by a policy adopted to keep the latter safe. Risk to civilians is reduced 
not as far as practically possible, but as far as judged necessary to avoid adverse 
global media coverage. Civilians' risks are proportional not to the risks to soldiers, as 
Walzer envisaged, but to the political risks of adverse media coverage. Thus even if there 
is a limit to the risks we can require of soldiers, it can surely be shown that Western 
forces in Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Gulf have gone nowhere near to this limit. We could 
conclude that even if the aims of the 'war on terrorism' are just, its methods are 
insufficiently so. 
It could be argued that my argument here vindicates Walzer's extension of the 
just war tradition, since I have used his case to provide a basis for criticising US 
policy. This is the line taken by Falk, who claims that 'The "just war" doctrine 
provides the most flexible and relevant normative framework. It has roots in the 
ethics of all the great world religions, it is a vital source of modern international 
law governing the use of force and it focuses attention on the causes, means and 
ends of war.' However it seems to me that the opposite could just as plausibly be 
claimed. Wars in which mortal risk to one's own combatants is reduced virtually 
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to nil, but such risk is routinely inflicted on substantial numbers of innocent 
civilians, require such flexibility that they extend the 'double effect' and 
'proportionality' ideas to the point of absurdity. This may no longer be the most 
appropriate framework within which to evaluate the legitimacy of war. 
The degeneracy of war and the case for historical pacificism 
I do not doubt that a consistent exponent of the just war tradition, like Falk, could 
try to rehabilitate it in the face of this reductio ad absurdam. But this would miss the 
point. The West is using armed force in a way that kills, directly, more enemy 
fighters than civilians; it generally doesn't target civilians except in error; it aims 
to minimise 'collateral damage' and 'accidental' massacres. Although civilians are 
still killed, in historical, especially mid-twentieth century, terms the numbers of 
victims are small. The new Western way of war thus meets, prima facie, many of 
the historic demands for just war, even if we may question some excesses. 
However, if my argument has been accepted, there is still something 
fundamentally awry. That disparity between over 1000 innocent Afghans killed, 
to one American, says it all. 
If we are not satisfied with the justifications offered, this suggests that we may be 
applying different standards. In the rest of this paper, I want to explore what these 
may be, where they have come from, and where they may be leading. One 
obvious source of alternative standards is the political ethics of human rights. 
War has long been protected in Western thought from the norms that apply 
elsewhere in social life; but we may now be applying to war the standards from 
which it has previously been exempt. 'Thou shalt not kill' has been tightened as a 
general norm, with fewer and fewer exceptions allowed; many Western states 
even decline to impose the death penalty. And yet war has remained a huge 
exception. Could it be that now that exception is being challenged, that tight 
norms against killing are being extended even into the realm of legitimate 
organised killing itself? 
There is certainly some evidence to suggest this. The enhanced concern to protect 
Western soldiers' lives is in itself a historic change: it reflects the outcry over the 
deaths of GIs in Vietnam, and a rejection of the idea of 'cannon fodder' in favour 
of the notion of soldiers' rights. As military sociology has shown, (professional) 
soldiering is now viewed more as an 'occupation'; one, certainly, with different 
risks, but still one in which all efforts must be made to reduce risk. This is far 
from the notion of the heroic warrior. And when things go wrong, officers and 
governments must be made to take responsibility. During the Gulf War, 9 British 
servicemen were killed when their vehicle was mistakenly attacked by a US plane: 
the largest loss of British lives in a single incident during this conflict. The 
soldiers' families took the British Ministry of Defence to court, and tried to get the 
US airmen brought as witnesses, in an effort to hold the state accountable for the 
avoidable accident of their sons' deaths. They did not fully succeed in their aims, 
but they did make the matter a cause of public debate. It is difficult to imagine 
any comparable concern over the lives of soldiers in similar incidents in earlier 
wars, simply because large-scale loss of life was so commonplace. But when 
numbers of deaths are reduced to small numbers, partly in consequence of fear 
about political effects of casualties, then individual lives can be made to matter. 
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In an age of human rights, this concern for individuals is in principle extended to 
individual civilians, and may even begin to apply to enemy soldiers too. After all, 
concern about illegitimate killing has been magnified in the justification of recent 
wars: where they are not actually proclaimed to halt human rights abuses, as in 
Kosovo, they may well be designed to punish the perpetrators of killing against 
innocent civilians, as after 9/11. Alongside these wars there are legal proceedings: 
the activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) were ratcheted up during the Kosovo War, and some at least of the al-
Qaida captives will face criminal cases (and there is evident inconsistency and 
embarrassment in the US attempts to keep the Guantanamo Bay prisoners away 
from the courts). Not surprisingly, the ICTY felt obliged to consider the case 
against NATO itself for its 'accidental' massacres of civilians in Serbia and 
Kosovo. The report of the Committee it established made a case that there is no 
prima facie basis for formally investigating NATO's conduct of that war. Whether, 
in terms of the current law of war, that was a correct conclusion is not my 
concern here. What is clear is that NATO could be held accountable, in principle 
at least, for the deaths of the civilian victims. What was driving the demand for 
justice was not so much the legal norms as the perception that all the individual 
lives mattered: the three people killed in the Chinese embassy, the 16 killed in the 
Serbian TV station, the 70 killed when a railway bridge was bombed, and so on. 
Incidents as small as traffic accidents, in terms of numbers of victims, could be 
matters for which the world's most powerful state could be brought to account, 
and in basically the same way. 
No wonder that the US is concerned about the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court. The laws of war were never intended to be applied in criminal 
courts in this manner. The drive to do this stems from general trends towards 
intensified legal regulation, heightened awareness of individual rights and 
extensive litigation - trends that derive much of their momentum (ironically) from 
US society. But criminalization involves treating war like any other human 
activity, no longer de facto or even de jure excluded from norms that apply in all 
other fields. Taking 'Thou shalt not kill' seriously, in the context of war, does 
indeed threaten to make the practice of war very difficult. If the means of war are 
generally picked over with a fine toothcomb, in the courts, in the press and 
(indeed) in academia, then the legitimacy of war will be regularly undermined. 
It is difficult, therefore, to resist the conclusion that the door has been 
fundamentally opened to new kinds of delegitimation of war. Regardless of 
Western governments' success in mobilising media and public opinion in 
particular cases, like the opening phase of the 'war on terrorism', the new Western 
way of war is generally vulnerable to new criticisms that will, sooner or later, 
challenge its even its newly refined justifications. The failure of any of the 
transfers of risk could expose the West to risk rebound. If airpower is insufficient 
to break the enemy, if the local forces are incapable of carrying out ground 
operations - or if they commit too many atrocities - or if the fickle media turn 
away from their would-be masters, the risks of the new mode of war will return to 
the West. 
In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, it appeared that war was fundamentally 
compromised by the tendency of 'limited' wars like Vietnam, as well as of large-
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scale 'conventional' and nuclear war, to produce large numbers of civilian 
casualties. Since the 1990s, Western governments and militaries have developed a 
new mode that seems to have overcome this problem. What I have tried to show 
in this paper is that alongside this new mode have come new bases for criticising 
war. The legacy of degenerate war can still be identified in disparities of risk: 
war's legitimacy can be challenged through even the smallest episodes of killing. 
Historical pacifism, though challenged by the reinvention of war, is being 
renewed, as the tests for justly killing get ever tighter. 
  
Table 1. Death tolls in the US's war in Afghanistan (to end January 2002), 
compared to previous Western wars of the global era 
















































1. 'Civilians killed by enemy in precipitating events' refers to deaths during 
the acts of aggression that initiated the immediate conflict. It does not 
include the longer-term death tolls of earlier campaigns (e.g. Saddam 
Hussein's genocides, Serbian campaigns in Croatia and Bosnia, the 
Afghan civil war and Taliban repression) or subsequent war (e.g. Iraqi civil 
wars after the Gulf War, the elimination of the Marsh Arabs, etc.) .  
2. 'Indirectly caused civilian deaths as result of Western action' refers to 
estimates of civilian deaths in the immediate aftermath of the war (e.g. 
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civilian deaths as result of the US destruction of infrastructure in Iraq; and 
as a close consequence of recent bombing of Afghanistan). It does not 
include longer-term deaths in which the war may have been influential (e.g. 
as a result of later sanctions against Iraq, or possible long-term 
consequences of the Afghan war).  
3. To the end of March 2002, a total of 40 US troops had been killed in 
Afghanistan, but of these, 'Only 8 are listed as victims of enemy fire: most 
of the others died in crashes and accidents.' (Guardian, 30 March 2002).  
 
